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Abstract: 
 
This analysis characterizes empirically how good labour relations can alleviate the negative impact 
on productivity of regulatory constraints or workforce opposition. Our evidence of good labour 
relations lies in the existence of binding collective agreements, at the firm or at the industry level. The 
estimations are based on a unique dataset collected by the Banque de France about the obstacles 
French firms may face in increasing their utilisation of production factors. Data are an unbalanced 
sample of 7,441 observations, corresponding to 1,545 companies, over the period 1991-2008.  
 
Our main results may be summarised as follows: i) ‘workforce or union opposition’ interacted with 
‘regulatory constraints’ has a negative significant impact on total factor productivity (TFP). 
Regulatory constraints would become really binding when workers or unions use them as a tool to 
oppose management’s decisions; ii) ‘regulatory constraints’ interacted with ‘branch or firm 
agreement’ has a positive significant impact on TFP. These agreements, which can only be obtained if 
labour relations are supportive, would be used by firms to offset the negative impact of regulatory 
constraints.  
 
These results confirm that labour relations quality, at the branch or the firm levels, is an important 
factor of productive performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A large amount of literature has been analysing the impact of worker voices, and more generally of 
work relations quality, on firm performances. An important part of this literature characterizes work 
relations by representative institutions, such as unions or works councils, and investigates their impact 
on firm performances. These performances are themselves characterized by labour productivity, total 
factor productivity or profitability. As a matter of fact, these studies do not really provide a unified and 
simple message.  
 
Concerning the effect of unionization, the literature surveys from Hirsch (2007) and Morikawa (2010) 
show that while a majority of analyses find a positive impact on productivity, some do find a non-
significant impact or even a negative one. For example, both on US individual firm data, Brown and 
Medoff (1978) find a positive impact and Clark (1984) a negative one. On the same type of data, 
Cooke (1994) or Black and Lynch (2001) give an explanation of this contrast: they find a positive 
impact of unionization on productivity only in firms where the employer adopts some human resource 
practices that promote joint decision with incentive-based compensation, and a negative impact in 
firms that maintain more traditional labour management relations. The impact of unionization on 
average wage is found to be usually positive, but the impact on firm profitability is ambiguous, 
positive or negative depending on the study.  
 
The survey from Addison (2005) also highlights contrasted conclusions in the literature regarding the 
impact of works councils on productivity. Addison et al. (2000) on German and British firms and 
Addison et al. (2001) on German firms obtain a positive impact in large firms only. Fairris and 
Askenazy (2010) find, on French firms, no evidence of a positive impact of works councils on firm 
productivity and even some limited evidence of a negative effect. Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) provide 
an empirical explanation of these different results. Based on German firms, their study shows a 
positive impact of works councils on productivity only within firms covered by collective agreements. 
This empirical result is actually in line with the theoretical paper from Freeman and Lazear (1994) 
which shows that works councils can improve firm productivity under certain conditions: “There are 
potential net social gains from works councils. But to work best and gain these potential benefits, the 
rules governing councils must be carefully written to bound the power of labor and management and 
‘fit’ the broader labor system in which councils must function”. It appears that works councils can 
improve firm productivity only in situations where the quality of labour relations is good enough to 
prevent some risks of inefficiency. The positive impact on productivity results in fact from the 
interaction between works councils and these good labour relations, works councils being however a 
negative productivity factor if taken individually.  
 
The large literature on the quality of labour relations focused on indicators such as strikes (Kleiner, 
Leonard and Pilarski, 2002; Mas, 2008), grievance fillings (Ichniowski, 1986; Katz, Kochan and 
Gobeille, 1983), absenteeism (Katz, Kochan and Gobeille, 1983), tough union leaders (Lazear, 1995; 
Kleiner, Leonard and Pilarski, 2002) and labour climate surveys among managers or workers of a 
specific plant (Katz, Kochan and Gobeille, 1983; Deery and Roderick 2005; Katz, Kochan and Keefe, 
1987). These papers support the negative impact of a deteriorated labour climate on productivity or 
product quality. More precisely, Deery and Iverson (2005) point out the building blocks of a good 
labour climate, as reflected by an employee survey: in particular, the union’s willingness to adopt an 
integrative approach to bargaining and the management’s willingness to share information freely with 
the union. However, these papers are based on case studies (different plants of the same firm in 
automobile, aircraft, paper mills...) and do not address the impact of firm or branch agreements or of 
the interactions between these agreements and labour relations. 
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Our aim is to characterize the impact on productivity of good labour relations. In France, large 
margins of improvement in labour relations quality may exist, as compared to other countries. Trade 
union density is the lowest among OECD countries (7.6% in 2008 for 18.6% in Germany according to 
the OECD) and labour regulations at the national level rarely stem from union-employers negotiation. 
Aghion et al. (2011) highlight that in a cross-section of countries, state regulation of labour markets is 
negatively correlated with the quality of labour relations. They argue that state regulation crowds out 
the possibility for workers to experiment negotiation and learn about the potential cooperative nature 
of labour relations. This mechanism seems to be particularly relevant for France, where state 
intervention in the labour market regulation is widespread and pregnant.  
 
Our empirical analysis is based on a unique survey of French firms, about the obstacles they may face 
in increasing their production factor utilisation: the survey on factor utilisation degrees (FUD 
hereafter). We merge these data with FiBEn, another individual company dataset collected by the 
Banque de France. FiBEn is a very large database that includes balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts from annual tax statements, and can be used to compute total factor productivity (TFP) and 
changes in output. The FUD survey has been carried out every year since 1989 by the Banque de 
France at the plant level. It not only provides rich insights about firm-level factor utilisation, but also a 
unique appraisal of rigidities faced by firms in increasing their capital workweek. Firms are directly 
asked to declare the presence of such rigidities, and to characterize their legal, social or technical 
nature. More precisely, entrepreneurs answered the following question: « If you had to increase your 
capital operating time, and if your sales potential could justify it, would you meet obstacles or brakes 
such as… ? ». The considered obstacles are: worker opposition, union opposition, absence of qualified 
workforce, bottleneck on commodities or supply, technical obstacles, legal or regulatory constraint, 
branch agreement, firm agreement, and other. The merger of these two databases results in an 
unbalanced sample of 7,441 observations, corresponding to 1,545 companies, over the period 1991-
2008. To our knowledge, this individual company database is unique for allowing an empirical 
analysis concerning the impact of these rigidities on TFP. As in Hübler and Jirjahn (2003), our 
evidence of good labour relations lies in the existence of binding collective agreements, at the firm or 
at the industry level. In France, the ability to conclude a collective agreement is a clear sign of good 
labour relations, between employers and at least some unions. Hence, even if it is declared as an 
obstacle to increase the capital operating time, the existence of a collective agreement (at the branch or 
the firm level) remains an appropriate proxy for good labour relations.  
 
The empirical strategy consists in estimating a relation where firm-level TFP is explained by output 
changes, wages per employee, year, sector-year and firm-specific fixed effects along with different 
obstacles declared by firms, these obstacles being considered individually or interacted for some of 
them. These estimates may face a double causality bias: firms benefitting from high TFP may be able 
to provide higher wages. Employers could therefore overcome worker or union opposition, better 
secure supply, attract talents and negotiate more favourable firm agreements by being able to provide 
more generous compensations for increased flexibility. In order to address this bias, we implemented 
an instrumentation strategy based on Blundell and Bond (1998) using lagged obstacles levels and 
changes as instruments. We did also control for wages.  
 
Our main results may be summarised as follows: i) ‘workforce or union opposition’ interacted with 
‘regulatory constraints’ has a negative significant impact on total factor productivity (TFP). 
Regulatory constraints would become really binding when workers or unions use them as a tool to 
oppose management’s decisions; ii) ‘regulatory constraints’ interacted with ‘branch or firm agreement’ 
has a positive significant impact on TFP. These agreements, which can only be obtained if labour 
relations are supportive, would be used by firms to offset the negative impact of regulatory constraints.  
 
These results support the importance of labour relations quality, at the branch or the firm levels, as a 
powerful factor of productive performance. They provide an original confirmation to early insights in 
the literature (e.g. Freeman and Lazear, 1994). 
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Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 details the empirical strategy and section 4 comments on the 
results. Section 5 displays the outcome of several robustness checks and section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Data and obstacles to increase capital operating time 
 
2.1. An original dataset 
 
Our empirical analysis merges two firm-level annual datasets constructed by the Banque de France: 
FiBEn and a survey on factor utilisation degrees (FUD).  
 
FiBEn is a large database built on fiscal documents, including balance sheets and profit-and-loss 
statements. It features all French firms with sales exceeding €750,000 per year, or with a credit 
outstanding higher than €380,000. Every year, these accounting data are available for about 200,000 
firms. In 2004, FiBEn was covering 80 % of the firms with 20 to 500 employees, and 98 % of those 
employing more than 500 employees. This database allows calculating firm-level value added (Q), the 
capital stock (K), the volume of employment (L) and computing total factor productivity (TFP):  
 
- The value added volume (Q) is calculated by dividing value added in value (production in value 
minus intermediate consumptions) by a national accounting index of value added price at the 
industry level (two digit decomposition level). 
 
- The volume of capital (K) sums gross capital volumes for buildings and equipment. Gross 
capital at historical price (as reported in tax statements) is divided by a national index for 
investment price, lagged with the mean age of gross capital (itself calculated from the share of 
depreciated capital in gross capital, at historical price). This measure corresponds to the volume 
of capital, usually by the end of a fiscal year. For this reason, we introduce a one-year lag for 
capital to compute share-weighted factor growth. 
 
- The average employment level (L) is directly available in FiBEn. 
 
- Total factor productivity for firm i in sector j at date t (TFPijt) is obtained by dividing total value 
added Qijt by the volume of production inputs Vijt, where: 
 
 
 
with αj the labour share in revenue for sector j, calculated from the median over firms in this industry, 
on the dataset period. 
 
The FUD survey has been carried out each September since 1989
1
. 1,500 to 2,500 plants
2
 are covered 
by this survey, depending on the year. This dataset directly provides for each plant the annual growth 
rate of capital workweek (WK) and the level of labour workweek (WL). 
 
While the FUD survey is carried out at the plant level, FiBEn gives information at the firm level. A 
difficulty in the data merge lies in the fact that some firms are multi plants. When several plants of a 
single firm were covered by the FUD survey, we aggregated for each year all plants of this firm, 
weighting them by their share in the firm’s total employment. We considered the FUD survey answers 
to be representative enough when the employment level corresponding to this aggregation was higher 
than 50 % of the one reported in FiBEn (otherwise, the firm was dropped from the final dataset3). Each 
                                                     
1
 2002 is unfortunately not present in the dataset since accidentally, paper questionnaires for the 2002 survey are 
no longer available at Banque de France. 
2
These plants are the ones usually covered by the Banque de France monthly survey on business climate. 
3
 In the final dataset, only 55 observations correspond to multi-plants firms. 
  
	

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time one observation was missing for a given firm, we interpolated its value taking the average of its 
one-period past and one-period next observations.  
 
The sample used in this paper is an unbalanced firm panel of 7,441 observations, corresponding to 
1,545 companies, over the period 1991-2008. The criteria underlying this sample selection are detailed 
below.  
 
 
2.2. Obstacles to shifts in capital operating time 
 
Our dataset not only provides rich insights about firm-level factor utilisation, but also a unique 
appraisal of rigidities faced by firms in increasing their capital workweek. Firms were directly asked to 
declare the presence of such rigidities and to characterize their legal, social or technical nature. More 
precisely, entrepreneurs answered the following question: « If you had to increase your capital 
operating time, and if your sales potential could justify it, would you meet obstacles or brakes such 
as…? »: 
 
1- Worker opposition (WOPP) 
2- Union opposition (UOPP) 
3- Absence of qualified workforce (ABS)  
4- Bottleneck on commodities or supply (BOTT) 
5- Technical obstacles (TOBS) 
6- Legal or regulatory constraint (REG) 
7- Branch agreement (BRA) 
8- Firm agreement (FIR) 
9- Other 
 
Beyond reporting obstacles, firms were also asked to rank them. Given the potential heterogeneity in 
the firms’ understanding of this ranking exercise, we preferred to particularly focus on the presence of 
an obstacle and made some methodological choices: in particular, some firms ranked systematically all 
obstacles, while some others selected just one, two or three obstacles. On the one hand, considering 
that an obstacle is present as soon as it is reported may be misleading, as some firms ranked all 
obstacles. On the other hand, considering only obstacles ranked in first position may rule out any 
possibility to analyse firms facing several rigidities. To deal with this “question understanding” 
potential bias, we choose to consider an obstacle as present if it is declared and ranked either in first, 
second or third position. 
 
A strong correlation and possible confusion between different obstacles led us to adopt an aggregation 
procedure, so as to reduce some potential interpretation and multicollinearity biases. We first decided, 
in an arbitrary way, to aggregate ABS, BOTT and TOBS in a single variable named « Skills, supply or 
technical constraints (TEC) », since the relevance of distinguishing these obstacles was weak in terms 
of policy implications. Then, we undertook a hierarchical clustering procedure, represented in Figure 
1, to further aggregate obstacles while keeping a strong explanatory power. 
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Figure 1: Hierarchical clustering procedure result 
 
 
Figure 1 displays the way obstacles are aggregated through the clustering procedure. The horizontal 
axis represents the share of variance still explained after aggregating variables (taking as a benchmark 
the non-aggregated model). The first obstacles to be aggregated were branch and firm agreements, 
then workforce and union opposition. Not only these two aggregations seem intuitively relevant, they 
also allow explaining more than 80 % of the variance associated with the non-aggregated model. We 
therefore decided to stop aggregating variables at this threshold, to avoid losing too much explanatory 
power with respect to the non-aggregated model. Table 1 summarizes the aggregation procedure 
outcome. 
 
 
Table 1: Aggregation procedure 
Aggregated obstacles
4
… … from originally declared obstacles 
Workforce or union opposition (OPP) - Workforce opposition (WOPP) 
- Union opposition (UOPP) 
Skills, supply or technical constraints (TEC) - Absence of qualified workforce (ABS) 
- Bottleneck on commodities or supply (BOTT) 
- Technical obstacles (TOBS) 
Regulatory constraint (REG) - Legal or regulatory constraint (REG) 
Branch or Firm Agreement (AGR) - Branch agreement (BRA) 
- Firm agreement (FIR) 
 
 
Looking at the evolution of obstacle declarations through time yields interesting insights (Graph 1).  
 
                                                     
4
 For instance, the OPP variable takes value 1 if workforce opposition (WOPP) and / or union opposition 
(UOPP) are / is declared, 0 otherwise. Other aggregates were built the same way, from their corresponding 
components. 
Skills, supply or  
technical constraints (TEC)
Union opposition (UOPP) 
Workforce opposition (WOPP)
Regulatory constraint(REG)
Firm agreement(FIR)
Branch agreement(BRA)
Proportion of Variance Explained 
Method: Varclus procedure under SAS 
 
1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 
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Graph 1: Obstacle declarations through time 
The panel is unbalanced, which may imply sample effects. 2002 is unfortunately not present in the dataset since accidentally, 
paper questionnaires for the 2002 survey are no longer available at the Banque de France. 
 
 
First, it appears that the different obstacles can easily be ranked in terms of reporting frequency, this 
hierarchy being quite stable through time. Each year, between 40% and 70% of firms signalled the 
presence of skills, supply or technical constraints (TEC), which makes them the most frequently 
reported obstacles. Workforce or union oppositions (OPP) were signalled by nearly 45% of firms 
every year, while regulatory obstacles were declared by a third of firms on average (with a peak at 
47% in 2001). Obstacles linked to collective agreements at the branch or firm level (AGR) would be 
the least reported rigidities, but would nevertheless be faced by around 15% of firms every year.  
 
Second, aside from these hierarchical considerations, we observe a kind of common trend between 
obstacle reporting, stemming probably from the business cycle and its perception by firms. A global 
increase in obstacle declarations can be highlighted between 1998 and 2001. It is easily understandable 
that during expansions, firms perceive constraints in a stronger way, precisely because they feel the 
need to increase their production and, therefore, their capital operating time. As a matter of fact, the 
TEC obstacle showed the strongest cyclical component over 1991-2008. 
 
Interestingly, the larger the firm, the more frequently obstacles are declared as regards workforce or 
union opposition (OPP) and branch or firm agreements (AGR) (see Graph 2). In contrast, the smaller 
the firm, the more frequently entrepreneurs report obstacles linked to skills, supply or technical 
constraints (TEC) and regulatory constraints (REG). This tends to show that large firms have 
developed means to adapt technical shortages and regulatory obstacles, but would suffer more than 
smaller firms from workers’ oppositions. Small firms in France are generally operating in a less 
unionized environment than big firms. This may explain why their reporting of obstacles linked to 
workforce or union opposition, and branch or firm agreements, is lower with respect to larger firms.  
 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Workforce or union opposition (OPP) Skills, supply or technical constraints (TEC)
Regulatory constraint (REG) Branch or Firm Agreement (AGR)
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Graph 2: Obstacles distribution by firm size 
 
 
 
Further descriptive statistics about the variables used may be found in the appendix. We now explain 
and detail in the following section our empirical strategy. 
 
 
3. Empirical methodology 
 
In the FUD survey, obstacles to increase capital operating time provide some rich information on the 
constraints that may prevent total factor productivity (TFP) improvements. In our estimations, these 
obstacles will therefore be used as TFP regressors, on the sub-sample of firms reporting at least one 
obstacle5.  
 
Skills, supply or technical constraints (TEC) bear on human capital and on capital utilisation in the 
upper phase of the cycle, which will impact our  TFP measure. These shortages may constrain firms to 
adopt some sub-optimal production organisation or process, which could have an impact on TFP. 
Workforce or union opposition (OPP) directly bears on TFP through a lower effort from the workers, 
or indirectly through a resistance to reorganisations of the production process. Regulatory constraints 
(REG) or branch/firm agreements (AGR) may hinder TFP-improving reorganisations. On the other 
hand, AGR testifies of a significant worker involvement, alleviating information asymmetries between 
employees and management and reducing economic inefficiencies (Freeman and Lazear, 1995), and 
more globally of good labour relations quality, which can have a positive productivity impact. Indeed, 
unionization (Brown and Medoff, 1978) or worker voices (Fairris and Askenazy, 2010) have been 
shown to have a positive impact on firm productivity. 
                                                     
5
 There may be a bias in using this sub-sample as firms reporting obstacles need to increase capital operating 
time and hence may be in a tense production phase. To deal with this potential issue, we control for the firm-
specific production cycles through its value added growth as an explanatory variable, and for the firm 
structural situation through firm fixed effects. The whole sample cannot be used since firms that report no 
obstacle may do so because they do not need to increase their capital operating time, not because they do not 
face any obstacle. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Workforce or union 
opposition (OPP)
Skills, supply or technical 
constraints (TEC)
Regulatory constraint (REG) Branch or Firm Agreement 
(AGR)
Size 1 (<51 employees) Size 2 (51-250 employees) Size 3 (>250 employees)
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Some interactions between obstacles may be relevant. Indeed, workforce or union opposition may be 
more detrimental to TFP if this opposition can use regulatory constraints to prevent reorganisations of 
the production process (OPP*REG). On the contrary, firm or branch agreements may have an 
ambiguous role, either acting as a kind of regulatory constraint in interaction with workers’ opposition, 
or alleviating the degree of workforce opposition (OPP*AGR) and helping overcome rigidities 
stemming from regulation (REG*AGR). 
 
The estimated equation is the following:  
 
,    ∆,  ,  ∑ ,,  ,     !,
"#
"   (1) 
 
 
with variables: 
• tfp: total factor productivity (in log) 
• q: value added (in log) 
• w: wages per employee (in log) 
• OBSk: obstacles to increasing capital operating time 
• X: a vector of controls including sector-year dummies 
• δ: firm fixed effects 
• !: error term 
 
and subscripts: 
• i for firm 
• j for industry 
• t for year 
 
We use sector-year dummies to control for industry cycles and TFP trends
6
. Value added growth 
controls for potential mismeasurements of factor utilisation in the TFP regression (cf. Cette et al., 
2011), firm-specific cycles or activity trends. Wages per employee control for the unmeasured quality 
of human capital, but also for the favourable impact of a generous wage policy on labour climate. We 
also use firm-specific fixed effects, which control for time-invariant firm unobserved heterogeneity 
such as management quality.  
 
We may face a double causality bias: firms benefitting from high TFP may be able to provide higher 
wages, overcoming worker or union opposition, to better secure supply, attract talents and negotiate 
more favourable firm agreements by being able to provide more generous compensations for increased 
flexibility. In order to address this bias, we implement an instrumentation strategy based on Blundell 
and Bond (1998) using lagged obstacles levels and changes as instruments. Changes in value added 
may be endogenous and are also instrumented the same way. As we may face heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation, we use the generalised method of moments with robust standard errors. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
The main estimates are presented in Table 2. It is noteworthy to emphasise that OLS results are 
consistent with 2SLS ones in terms of sign if not significance.  
 
 ‘Value added growth’ has a positive and significant impact on the TFP level, with stable 
coefficients, around 0.28 for 2SLS estimates (columns 2 and 4). This result, usually found in empirical 
                                                     
6
 With an upward-trending TFP regressed on obstacles taking values 0 or 1, year dummies are needed to avoid 
estimating a spurious relationship. 
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studies, indicates the existence of short-term increasing returns to production factors. Cette et al. 
(2011) argue they can be due to omitted variables, particularly the intensity of factor utilisation. With 
the very same data set, they show how increasing returns to scale disappear when working time, 
capacity utilisation rate and mainly capital operating time are introduced in the production function.  
 
 ‘Wages per employee’ has a positive and significant impact on the TFP level, with quite stable 
coefficients, around 0.26 for 2SLS estimates (columns 2 and 4), which is consistent with the literature. 
‘Skills, supply or technological constraints’ have no significant impact on the TFP level, which may 
not be surprising. Shortages may constrain firms to adopt a non-optimal production organisation or 
process, which could decrease or increase, depending on the situation, the TFP level compared to a 
situation without such shortages. For example, a shortage in labour or capital may lead to a more 
intensive use of the available quantity of these two factors, and increase TFP. Moreover, as this 
obstacle is reported by many firms throughout the period (cf. Graph 1), its impact may be captured by 
firm fixed effects as it may reflect the usual recruitment policy or supply management of the firm. 
 
Without taking into account the potential interactions between explanatory variables (columns 1 and 
2), ‘workforce or union opposition’ is the only obstacle which would have a significant impact on 
productivity. The existence of such an opposition would decrease TFP by around 2% (column 2). 
‘Regulatory constraints’ do not have a significantly negative direct impact on productivity.  
Nonetheless, it appears (columns 3 and 4) that these regulatory constraints do have a negative impact 
on TFP when ‘workforce or union opposition’ are reported, leading to a -2% decrease in TFP on 
average (column 4). This suggests that ‘regulatory constraints’ would only become significantly 
binding when workers or unions use them as a tool to oppose management decisions. For example, 
working time rules are complex and workers or unions, through the threat of legal procedure, may lead 
to a stricter application of these rules in cases of deteriorated labour relations. 
 
Besides, ‘branch or firm agreement’ has no direct impact on TFP (columns 1 to 4) but the 
interaction between ‘branch and firm agreement’ and ‘regulatory constraints’ has a positive and 
significant impact (columns 3 and 4). These puzzling results can receive two explanations. First, a 
branch or firm collective agreement can organize efficient working organisations, thus alleviating 
regulatory constraints. Secondly, the French labour code allows softening specified regulatory 
constraints through a collective agreement. This was emphasised in the context of the 35-hour 
workweek policy implemented in France from 1998, after the left-wing electoral victory of 1997
7
. 
This policy consisted in a decrease from 39 to 35 hours, in 2000 for firms of more than 20 employees 
(which represent more than 97% of our sample) and in 2002 for other firms, of the legal weekly 
working time threshold from which firms have to pay an overtime wage premium. For a firm 
decreasing to 35 hours or less the usual weekly working time of its employees, it was possible to get 
generous financial subsidies from the State if this decrease was organised through a collective 
agreement between social partners, at the firm level for firms of more than 50 employees and also 
possibly at the branch level for other firms. To get these subsidies, the agreements had to be signed by 
unions representing at least 50% of the employee votes at union elections. But the 35 hour workweek 
laws allowed firms to implement through a collective agreement some flexible labour organisation 
with a possible positive impact on TFP. For instance, it was possible through agreements to exclude 
some breaks of the accounted working time, or to account daily rather than hourly the working time 
for white collars, or to respect the 35 hours threshold in average over the year or even in average over 
several years. But the use of these disposals needed good quality labour relations, employee unions 
having the choice not to allow it. The results also indicate that ‘branch or firm agreement’ would have 
offset the significant negative impact of the interaction between ‘regulatory constraints’ and ‘work 
force or union opposition’, as it yields a positive impact of 4% on TFP. The interaction between 
‘branch or firm agreement’ and ‘work force or union opposition’ is not significant when instrumented: 
indeed, ‘branch or firm agreement’ may actually be alleviating ‘work force or union opposition’ and 
hence neutralising its impact. 
                                                     
7
 The 35-hour workweek policy change is captured in our analysis by the year fixed-effect. 
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Table 3 displays estimates where branch and firm agreements are separated. It is difficult to identify 
separately both types of agreements which are highly correlated but it appears that the positive 
interacted impact of ‘agreements’ with ‘regulatory constraints’ would result mostly from ‘firm 
agreements’ rather than ‘branch agreements’ (table 3, column 6). This result indicates that it is mainly 
at the firm level that good quality labour relations can allow to use some complex regulation disposals 
to improve the firm’s productive performance.  
 
These results support the role of labour relations quality, mainly at the firm level, as a powerful factor 
of productive performance. They provide an original confirmation to early insights in the literature 
(e.g. Freeman and Lazear, 1994). 
 
 
5. Robustness checks 
 
 
Our flagship result is the structural regression in Table 2, column 4, which emphasises the role of 
interactions between regulatory constraints, branch or firm agreements, and employee or union 
opposition. In Table 4, we present several robustness checks for this regression, on different sub-
samples: 
 
• First, we exclude firms which TFP level lies in the first or last 5 percentiles. That way, we 
assess whether our results are driven by a small number of extreme observations. The 
coefficient signs are not altered, although their significance changes: REG * AGR is still 
significant, but OPP * REG is not.  
• Then, we exclude one by one all sectors representing more than 5% of the sample, to evaluate 
the sensitivity of our results to specific activities (although we already had firm fixed effects 
and year-industry dummies in the reference equation). Significance and magnitude of the 
coefficients are barely altered, especially for REG*AGR. OPP * REG is however not 
significant for a large number of subsamples.  
 
We provide in Table 5 further robustness estimates with different specifications: 
 
• We remove year*sector dummies (column 1), while keeping year dummies which are 
necessary to avoid a spurious regression of a time series (TFP) on stationary variables. Our 
main results are not altered: REG*AGR and OPP*REG keep the same signs significance and 
magnitude. The magnitude is stronger for REG*AGR, although less precise.  
• We remove the firm production cycle control, ∆$. Indeed, this control may encompass a lot 
of relationships beyond the firm production cycle (in particular supply shocks due to our 
variables of interest). Coefficients in the reference equation are not altered in their signs or 
magnitude, but the OPP*REG is no longer significant. 
• We remove the control for wage per head, which may be collinear with labour relations. 
Coefficients are practically unaltered in signs or significance. 
 
Our main result, showing that the negative effect of regulatory constraints on productivity can be 
alleviated by branch or firm agreements, appears to be fairly robust. However, the fact that regulatory 
constraints may be more stringent when employees or unions use them to prevent TFP improvements 
tends to be non-significant under some robustness checks, although the sign and magnitude of this 
effect is unaltered.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
Our aim was to analyse the impact on productivity of good labour relations. We have used an original 
database containing 7,441 observations, corresponding to 1,545 French companies, over 1991-2008. 
To our knowledge, this company-level database is unique in allowing such an analysis. We assume the 
existence of a collective agreement (at the branch or the firm level) to be a proxy for good labour 
relations.  
 
The main results from our empirical investigation are the following: i) ‘workforce or union opposition’ 
interacted with ‘regulatory constraints’ has a negative significant impact on total factor productivity 
(TFP). Regulatory constraints would become really binding when workers or unions use them as a 
tool to oppose management’s decisions; ii) ‘regulatory constraints’ interacted with ‘branch or firm 
agreement’ has a positive significant impact on TFP. These agreements, which can only be obtained if 
labour relations are supportive, would be used by firms to offset the negative impact of regulatory 
constraints. These results support the importance of labour relations quality and provide an original 
confirmation to early insights in the literature. 
 
Nevertheless, we must remain cautious in generalising these results, since France is a particular 
country concerning working relations. Among OECD countries, France has the lowest union 
membership rate. Related with that, France is probably the country (or at least one of the countries) 
where labour market regulation is the most stringent and where collective bargaining processes are the 
poorest and the weakest. Labour relations get conflictual more quickly, leading more easily to strikes 
for example, in France than in other countries. In such circumstances, the ability to conclude a 
collective agreement is probably a stronger indication for good labour relations in France than 
elsewhere. We cannot exclude that the impact of collective agreement, taken as a proxy of good labour 
relations, could have a positive but lower impact on productivity in other countries. Our result would 
need to be confirmed on a database covering other countries, for it to be generalised.  
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Appendix 
Descriptive Statistics 
FiBEn & FUD (Factor Utilisation Degrees) survey 
Variable  Description Source p10 Q1 Median Q3 P90 Mean 
Standard 
Error 
OPP Worker or union 
opposition FUD survey 0 0 0 1 1 0,43 0,49 
TEC 
Skills, supply or 
technical 
constraints FUD survey 0 0 1 1 1 0,50 0,50 
REG Regulatory 
constraints FUD survey 0 0 0 1 1 0,31 0,46 
AGR Branch or firm 
agreement FUD survey 0 0 0 0 1 0,16 0,37 
BRA 
Branch 
agreement FUD survey 0 0 0 0 1 0,12 0,33 
FIR Firm agreement FUD survey 0 0 0 0 1 0,13 0,33 
OPP x REG FUD survey 0 0 0 0 1 0,20 0,40 
OPP x AGR FUD survey 0 0 0 0 1 0,13 0,33 
OPP x BRA FUD survey 0 0 0 0 0 0,10 0,30 
OPP x FIR FUD survey 0 0 0 0 1 0,11 0,31 
REG x AGR FUD survey 0 0 0 0 1 0,12 0,32 
REG x BRA FUD survey 0 0 0 0 1 0,10 0,30 
REG x FIR FUD survey 0 0 0 0 0 0,09 0,28 
TFP 
Total factor 
productivity in 
log 
FiBEn 
2,43 2,62 2,84 3,10 3,38 2,87 0,40 
△q 
1st difference 
value added in 
log 
FiBEn 
-0,17 -0,06 0,02 0,11 0,21 0,02 0,20 
w Labour cost  per 
employee  in log 
FiBEn 
3,13 3,30 3,47 3,64 3,80 3,46 0,28 
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Industry (control variables) 
B0 
C1 
C2 
C3 
C4 
D0 
E1 
E2 
E3 
F1 
F2 
F3 
F4 
F5 
F6 
 
Agriculture and food industry (AFI) 
Clothing, leather and footwear 
Paper, printing and publishing 
Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel  
Household equipment industries  
Industry 
Shipbuilding, aeronautic and railway industries 
Mechanical equipment industries 
Electric and electronic equipment industries 
Mineral products industry 
Textile industry 
Wood and paper industry 
Chemicals and plastics industry  
Metallurgy and metal transformation 
Electric and electronic components industry 
Frequency 
10.1 
5.7 
7.0 
1.7 
5.4 
2.2 
1.5 
14.5 
3.4 
3.8 
3.7 
9.8 
7.9 
20.0 
3.3 
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Table 2 - Main results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Without 
interactions 
Without 
interactions – 
2SLS 
With 
interactions 
With 
interactions - 
2SLS 
∆.Value added (log) 0.526*** 0.285*** 0.527*** 0.279*** 
 (0.00970) (0.0226) (0.00970) (0.0229) 
     
Wage per head (log) 0.224*** 0.263*** 0.225*** 0.259*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0326) (0.0147) (0.0328) 
     
Worforce or union opposition (OPP
-1) -0.0091* -0.0217** -0.00150 0.00377 
(0.0048) (0.0092) (0.0060) (0.0080) 
     
Skills, supply or technical constraints 
(TEC
-1) 
0.0058 0.0198 0.00438 -0.0058 
(0.0045) (0.0286) (0.0045) (0.0074) 
     
Regulatory constraints (REG
-1) 0.0059 0.00858 0.0070 0.0119 
(0.0049) (0.0082) (0.0073) (0.0106) 
     
Branch or firm agreement (AGR
-1) -0.0091 -0.0105 -0.0067 -0.0494 
(0.00585) (0.0104) (0.0132) (0.0323) 
     
Worforce or union opposition and 
regulatory constraints (OPP
-1 X REG-1) 
  -0.00994 -0.0208* 
  (0.0095) (0.0122) 
 
    
Worforce or union opposition and branch 
or firm agreement (OPP
-1 X AGR-1) 
  -0.0216* 0.0096 
  (0.0128) (0.0238) 
     
Regulatory constraints and branch or firm 
agreement  
(REG
-1 X AGR-1) 
  0.0217* 0.0420** 
  (0.0120) (0.0208) 
N° Observations 7,441 7,441 7,441 7,441 
Adj. R² 0.222 0.226 0.222 0.221 
Sargan-Hansen 
 14.90  6.031 
Sargan-Hansen p-value 
 0.313  0.420 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Firm fixed effects, two stage least square estimates when specified, generalized method of moments. Lagged 
levels and lagged difference of obstacles used as instruments. Year, Sector X Year dummies and constant 
included but not reported. 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.52
17 
Table 3 - Separating branch and firm agreements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Without 
interactions 
Without 
interactions - 
2SLS 
With 
interactions 
With 
interactions - 
2SLS 
∆.Value added (log) 0.526*** 0.284*** 0.527*** 0.283*** 
(0.00970) (0.0226) (0.00971) (0.0227) 
 
    
Wage per head (log) 0.225*** 0.263*** 0.225*** 0.262*** 
(0.0147) (0.0326) (0.0147) (0.0328) 
 
    
Worforce or union opposition (OPP
-1) -0.00934* -0.0240** -0.00204 0.00440 
(0.00487) (0.00964) (0.00602) (0.00777) 
     
Skills, supply or technical constraints 
(TEC
-1) 
0.00620 0.0270 0.00463 -0.00691 
(0.00451) (0.0343) (0.00461) (0.00758) 
     
Regulatory constraints (REG
-1) 0.00644 0.00921 0.00850 0.0141 
(0.00503) (0.00855) (0.00729) (0.0104) 
     
Branch agreement (BRA
-1) -0.0103 -0.0146 -0.0131 -0.0257 
(0.00794) (0.0106) (0.0198) (0.0571) 
 
    
Firm agreement (FIR
-1) -0.000200 0.00118 0.00927 -0.0564 
(0.00769) (0.0100) (0.0167) (0.0403) 
     
OPP
-1 X REG-1 
  -0.0114 -0.0232* 
 
  (0.00981) (0.0138) 
 
    
OPP
-1 X BRA-1 
  -0.0108 -0.00640 
 
  (0.0171) (0.0329) 
 
    
OPP
-1 X FIR-1 
  -0.0263 0.0317 
 
  (0.0177) (0.0348) 
 
    
REG
-1 X BRA-1 
  0.0103 0.0143 
 
  (0.0185) (0.0417) 
     
REG
-1 X FIR-1 
  0.0245 0.0465** 
   (0.0162) (0.0200) 
N° Observations 7,441 7,441 7,441 7,441 
Adj. R² 0.222 0.224 0.222 0.223 
Sargan-Hansen 
 14.05  11.69 
Sargan-Hansen p-value 
 0.297  0.232 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Firm fixed effects, two stage least square estimates when specified, generalized method of moments. Lagged levels 
and lagged difference of obstacles used as instruments. Year, Sector X Year dummies and constant included but not 
reported.  
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Table 4 – Robustness to exclusion of specific observations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Exclusion of… Reference 
equation 
First and 
last 5 
percentiles 
Food 
products 
Textile 
 
Printing Households 
equipment 
Mecanical 
equipments 
Wood chemicals metal 
products  
∆.Value added 
(log) 
0.279*** 0.195*** 0.295*** 0.274*** 0.272*** 0.276*** 0.281*** 0.278*** 0.272*** 0.282*** 
(0.0229) (0.0170) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0138) (0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0143) 
           
Wage per head 
(log) 
0.259*** 0.245*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.260*** 0.284*** 0.269*** 0.257*** 0.263*** 0.243*** 
(0.0328) (0.0334) (0.0162) (0.0160) (0.0157) (0.0163) (0.0168) (0.0159) (0.0155) (0.0169) 
           
OPP
-1 0.00377 -0.000475 0.00216 0.00475 0.00273 0.00288 0.00710 0.00608 0.00366 -0.00161 
(0.00803) (0.00754) (0.00842) (0.00844) (0.00845) (0.00841) (0.00875) (0.00869) (0.00837) (0.00919) 
           
TEC
-1 -0.00576 0.00429 -0.00874 -0.00522 -0.00425 -0.00685 -0.00705 -0.00436 -0.00306 -0.00420 
(0.00737) (0.00483) (0.00785) (0.00779) (0.00793) (0.00790) (0.00824) (0.00802) (0.00784) (0.00876) 
           
REG
-1 0.0119 0.00402 0.00974 0.0106 0.0149 0.0118 0.00570 0.0115 0.0139 0.0122 
(0.0106) (0.00964) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0113) (0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0123) 
           
AGR
-1 -0.0494 -0.0589* -0.0684** -0.0535 -0.0527 -0.0307 -0.0409 -0.0226 -0.0352 -0.0554 
(0.0323) (0.0330) (0.0330) (0.0325) (0.0337) (0.0336) (0.0337) (0.0341) (0.0316) (0.0356) 
           
OPP
-1 X REG-1 -0.0208* -0.00913 -0.0216* -0.0209* -0.0210 -0.0183 -0.0188 -0.0147 -0.0172 -0.0250* 
(0.0122) (0.0115) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0124) (0.0142) 
           
OPP
-1 X AGR-1 0.00963 0.0255 0.0270 0.0135 0.00853 -0.00351 0.00161 -0.0114 -0.00506 0.0182 
(0.0238) (0.0271) (0.0244) (0.0240) (0.0245) (0.0248) (0.0253) (0.0247) (0.0235) (0.0267) 
           
REG-1 X AGR-1 0.0420** 0.0415** 0.0498** 0.0417* 0.0432* 0.0344 0.0435** 0.0254 0.0334 0.0491** 
(0.0208) (0.0196) (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0222) (0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0226) (0.0208) (0.0229) 
N° Observations 7441 6567 6715 7009 6937 7047 6345 6683 6868 5902 
Adj. R² 0.221 0.191 0.246 0.223 0.217 0.226 0.161 0.232 0.234 0.223 
Sargan-Hansen 6.031 5.454 6.044 6.784 5.270 7.154 4.647 4.262 5.761 4.607 
Sargan-Hansen p-
value 
0.420 0.487 0.418 0.341 0.510 0.307 0.590 0.641 0.450 0.595 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Firm fixed effects, two stage least square estimates when specified. Lagged levels and 
lagged difference of obstacles used as instruments. Year, Sector X Year dummies and constant included but not reported. 
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Table 5 - Robustness to alternative specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Reference 
Equation 
Without year X 
sector dummies 
Without ∆ 
value added 
without wages 
∆.Value added (log) 0.279*** 0.275***  0.291*** 
(0.0229) (0.0239)  (0.0227) 
     
Wage per head (log) 0.259*** 0.268*** 0.305***  
(0.0328) (0.0366) (0.0354)  
     
Worforce or union opposition 
(OPP
-1) 
0.0038 0.0028 0.0029 0.00234 
(0.0080) (0.0087) (0.0092) (0.00823) 
     
Skills, supply or technical 
constraints (TEC
-1) 
-0.00576 -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.00584 
(0.00737) (0.0078) (0.0086) (0.00756) 
     
Regulatory constraints (REG
-1) 0.0119 0.0128 0.0123 0.0111 
(0.0106) (0.0118) (0.0124) (0.0109) 
     
Branch or firm agreement (AGR
-1) -0.0494 -0.0576 -0.0632* -0.0547* 
(0.0323) (0.0351) (0.0375) (0.0329) 
     
Worforce or union opposition and 
regulatory constraints (OPP
-1 X 
REG
-1) 
-0.0208* -0.0262* -0.0214 -0.0210* 
(0.0122) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0125) 
 
    
Worforce or union opposition and 
branch or firm agreement (OPP
-
1 X AGR-1) 
0.00963 0.00172 0.0229 0.0143 
(0.0238) (0.0235) (0.0274) (0.0242) 
     
Regulatory constraints and branch 
or firm agreement (REG
-1 X AGR-
1) 
0.0420** 0.0649* 0.0427* 0.0432** 
(0.0208) (0.0394) (0.0243) (0.0213) 
N° Observations 7,441 7,441 7,441 7,441 
Adj. R² 0.221 0.131 -0.0673 0.188 
Sargan-Hansen 6.031 14.02 4.574 6.562 
Sargan-Hansen p-value 0.420 0.232 0.600 0.363 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Firm fixed effects when specified, two stage least square estimates, generalized method of moments. Lagged levels 
and lagged difference of obstacles used as instruments. Year, Sector X Year dummies when specified and constant 
included but not reported. 
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